Wittgenstein and Lacan at the Limit

Produktdetails

Verlag

Springer International Publishing

Erschienen

2020

Sprache

English

Seiten

192

Infos

192 Seiten
210 mm x 148 mm

ISBN

978-3-030-16941-1

Hauptbeschreibung

This book brings together the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Lacan around their treatments of ‘astonishment,’ an experience of being struck by something that appears to be extraordinarily significant. Both thinkers have a central interest in the dissatisfaction with meaning that these experiences generate when we attempt to articulate them, to bring language to bear on them. Maria Balaska argues that this frustration and difficulty with meaning reveals a more fundamental characteristic of our sense-making capacities –namely, their groundlessness. Instead of disappointment with language’s sense-making capacities, Balaska argues that Wittgenstein and Lacan can help us find in this revelation of meaning’s groundlessness an opportunity to acknowledge our own involvement in meaning, to creatively participate in it and thereby to enrich our forms of life with language.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Chapter 1  Introduction

Chapter 2 The expression of astonishment         

Chapter 3 Groundlessness in the Tractatus         

Chapter 4 The groundlessness of meaning in Lacan's work           

Chapter 5 From deflection to reflection: a creative involvement with language

Chapter 6 From groundlessness to creativity: the merits of astonishment for Wittgenstein          

Chapter 7 From groundlessness to creativity: the merits of astonishment for Lacan         

Klappentext

This book brings together the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Lacan around their treatments of ‘astonishment,’ an experience of being struck by something that appears to be extraordinarily significant. Both thinkers have a central interest in the dissatisfaction with meaning that these experiences generate when we attempt to articulate them, to bring language to bear on them. Maria Balaska argues that this frustration and difficulty with meaning reveals a more fundamental characteristic of our sense-making capacities –namely, their groundlessness. Instead of disappointment with language’s sense-making capacities, Balaska argues that Wittgenstein and Lacan can help us find in this revelation of meaning’s groundlessness an opportunity to acknowledge our own involvement in meaning, to creatively participate in it and thereby to enrich our forms of life with language.

Über den AutorIn

Maria Balaska is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire, UK.